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DISPARAGING TRADEMARKS: WHO MATTERS
Jasmine Abdel-khalik*
For more than a century, non-majority groups have protested the use of trademarks
comprised of or containing terms referencing the group—albeit for various reasons.
Under the 1946 Lanham Act, Congress added a prohibition against registering
disparaging trademarks, which could offer protection to non-majority groups
targeted by the use of trademarks offensive to members of the group. The prohibi-
tion remained relatively unclear, however, and rarely applied in that context until a
group of Native Americans petitioned to cancel the Washington NFL team’s trade-
marks as either scandalous, offensive to the general population, or disparaging,
offensive to the referenced group. In clarifying the appropriate test for disparaging,
however, the decision makers have overly analogizing the two prohibitions, render-
ing the disparaging trademark prohibition less effective in protecting non-majority
groups from offensive trademarks.
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INTRODUCTION
[Speaker 1] I am trying to speak of this matter generally, and
the answer is that there is no necessity for it. There is no need
for it. There is no offense being committed. There being no
offense there should not be any such drastic punishment that
would tie up not only our business, but a great deal of the busi-
ness of our country, destroy trade-marks used throughout the
civilized world, cause a loss in the American industries at
the present time, just because of the supersensitiveness – and
I say it with all respect – the supersensitive conscience of some
very high-minded men. . . .
[Speaker 2] I want to call attention to the fact that we . . . feel
that it is not for other people to sit in judgment upon our possi-
ble supersensitiveness, because we believe we are here repre-
senting the conscience of our domination[sic] in the
question . . . .1
In 1914, the Quaker Oats Company faced a serious challenge to all
of its QUAKER trademarks.2 This challenge was not brought in court or
before the predecessor to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). Instead, the Society of Friends, commonly known as the
Quakers, brought its challenge to the legislative branch, first supporting an
Indiana state statute and then, finding the state statute ineffective, federal
legislation to criminalize the commercial use of any religious society,
church, or denomination’s name or nickname.3 The Quakers sought these
protections because the denomination was humiliated and offended by use
of its nickname, and its good character, as a trademark to sell goods, in-
cluding “Quaker whiskey, Quaker oats, Quaker engines, Quaker lace, and
Quaker vegetables of every description, and an almost innumerable list of
articles that have been put upon the market bearing the name ‘Quaker.’”4
Speculating that businesses may adopt QUAKER as a trademark because
Quakers have a reputation for being honest, the Quaker representative
suggested that consumers might be more likely to trust products marked as
1. Use of Name of Religious Organizations: Hearings on H.R. 15401 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 63rd Cong., 3d Sess. 16 (1914) [hereinafter Hearings on Use of Religious Org. Names]
(emphasis added). Speaker 1 was Mr. Lynden Evans, representing Quaker Oats Co. Speaker 2
was Mr. S.E. Nicholson, Chairman of the Friends Legislative Board, representing the Society of
Friends a/k/a Quakers.
2. See id. at 5.
3. Hearings on Use of Religious Org. Names, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 10, 11.
4. Id. at 6 (testimony of Mr. Nicholson, Chairman of the Friends Legislative Board); see
also Prohibition of Use in Commerce of Any Church Name: Hearing on S. 5262 Before a Subcommittee of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 63rd Congress, 3d Sess. 12 (1914) [hereinafter Hearing on Use of
Any Church Name].
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Quaker.5 However, the heart of the objection is twofold: not only is com-
mercialization “entirely foreign to the purposes of [its] existence[,]” but
also has led non-Quakers to find the religion disreputable.6
The first QUAKER trademark for cereal was registered in 1877 (al-
legedly by Quakers),7 but the company itself was founded in its current
incarnation in 1901.8 By 1914, Quaker Oats had already achieved great
success.9 Not surprisingly, therefore, Quaker Oats vociferously objected to
a bill that would criminalize future use of QUAKER as a trademark, with
its representative raising at least three themes: (1) there is no harm; (2)
criminalizing trademarks, and stripping companies of existing trademarks,
would hurt American businesses; and (3) any complaints are unwarranted
and demonstrate excessive “sensitivity.”10 The Quaker Oats representative
also claimed that the bulk of Americans were not offended—suggesting
that it is the general public’s opinion that matters rather than people in the
referenced group.11 In a contemporaneous news report, Quaker Oats also
noted that there are other definitions for “Quaker,”12 perhaps suggesting
that Americans may not even recognize Quaker Oats as related to the re-
ligious group. Of course, the figure of man dressed as a Quaker, which
appeared on the packaging and advertisements, belies that suggestion.13
The QUAKER dispute highlights a dual narrative problem. On the
one hand, a smaller group in American society14 is offended by trademark
5. Hearings on Use of Any Church Name, supra note 4, at 2-3.
6. Id. at 3-4, 12. At this time of American history, asserting that commercialization of
religious terms is degrading in some way is not, in point of fact, unique to the Quakers. Starting
within a few decades, other religious terms used for trademarks were rejected or cancelled as
scandalous. See infra note 47. However, the successful objections were not only long ago but
were also associated with larger religious denominations. One of the most recent objections,
associated with a small religious organization, was rejected.
7. QUAKER OATS, Quaker History: There’s a Whole Lot of History in Our Whole Grain Oat,
http://www.quakeroats.com/about-quaker-oats/content/quaker-history.aspx [hereinafter
Quaker History]; Hearings on Use of Any Church Name, supra note 4, at 7.
8. QUAKER OATS, Quaker FAQs: When was the Quaker Oats Company founded?, http://
www.quakeroats.com/about-quaker-oats/content/quaker-faq.aspx; but see Hearings on Use of Re-
ligious Org. Names, supra note 1, at 11-12 (noting that the business has been using QUAKER
trademarks for forty years as of 1914).
9. See Hearings on Use of Religious Org. Names, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that the business
was running between $35 and $40 million a year).
10. See id. at 16.
11. See, e.g., id. at 11.
12. See Quaker Oats Co. Won’t Quit Using ‘Quaker’ as Name, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL,
available at http://www.ohio.com/news/dec-12-1914-quaker-oats-co-won-t-quit-using-
quaker-as-name-1.547697 (republishing a Dec. 12, 1914 article on Dec. 8, 2014).
13. The QUAKER federal trademark registration included the figure of a man at least as
far back as 1877, and the 1882 first national magazine advertisement includes a more familiar
form of a man dressed as a Quaker. See Quaker History, supra note 7.
14. The Quaker representative noted that it believes only the Quakers, as a smaller relig-
ious group, were subjected to commercialization of its name as of 1914. He suggests that larger
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use of a term that refers to that group in some way. On the other, the
business trademark owner suggests that any such offensive is trivial, unim-
portant, or insignificant when weighed against economic interests. Fur-
ther, the business may suggest that there are, in fact, other meanings that
the American public would attach to the mark. In large part, this dispute
centers around—who matters? In assessing whether a trademark, appear-
ing in commerce, is offensive, whose feelings, interpretations, and mean-
ings should be validated and who should be ignored?
This dual narrative is in even starker relief today because of the cur-
rent dispute over the Washington NFL football team’s name (hereafter
“the Washington team”) in various trademarks, originally Harjo v. Pro
Football, Inc.15 and subsequently Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.16 The Wash-
ington team’s defense of its R__S___s mark is surprisingly parallel to that
of Quaker Oats a century ago.17 The Washington team first argues that the
marks do not cause any offense either because they are intended to honor
Native Americans, including the team’s first coach who claimed he was
Native American,18 or because they now are associated with a single foot-
ball team’s long and proud traditions.19 Note that this argument incorpo-
rates another Quaker Oats argument that almost accuses those that object
of some sort of self-aggrandizement or delusions of importance; specifi-
cally, because the term has different meanings, the referenced group
should not claim that Americans will automatically associate the mark with
the group rather than with one of the alternate meanings. Second, the
Washington team suggests, albeit more obliquely than Quaker Oats did in
1914, that economics trump any pain caused by hurtful words by arguing
that it is absolutely improper and unnecessarily costly to destroy trademark
rights on the claimed basis of hurt feelings, especially after decades of
denominations would have protested much earlier and have been accorded protection. Hearings
on Use of Any Church Name, supra note 4, at 3.
15. Harjo v. Pro Football, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
16. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 2011 TTAB LEXIS 77 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2011).
17. This Article will focus on trademarks accused of being or found to be offensive to the
general population or to specific groups within American society. Many of these offensive words
will need to be reproduced in order to be recognized and discussed. However, the Washington
team’s dispute is of such prominence now that the term does not need to be reproduced to be
discussed. As such, I intend to avoid reproducing it in its entirety except as necessary in quotes or
in article titles.
18. See Richard Leiby, The Legend of Lone Star Dietz: Redskins Namesake, Coach – and
Possible Imposter?, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/the-legend-of-lone-star-dietz-redskins-namesake-coach—and-possible-imposter/
2013/11/06/a1358a76-466b-11e3-bf0c-cebf37c6f484_story.html.
19. See John Keim, Dan Snyder Defends ‘Redskins,’ ESPN, (Oct. 10, 2013), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9797628/dan-snyder-defends-washington-redskins-name; see also
Alison Harding, Washington Redskins Owner Dan Snyder Defends Team Name in Letter, CNN (Oct.
10, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/09/us/washington-redskins-name/.
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use.20 And finally, there is the message that anyone from the targeted
group who protests is simply overly sensitive, signaling both that their
“sensitivities” are unwarranted and also that their feelings should be dis-
counted or found insufficiently important to alter existing trademarks.21
In response to Quaker Oats, a Quaker representative argued that pro-
tection is needed precisely to avoid situations where the majority can dis-
regard the harm caused to a minority group. Giving power to the
protesting voices may be particularly important as recent studies substanti-
ate the harm caused by, for example, the use of racial slurs or stereotypes
upon both the targeted population and the perceptions of the general pop-
ulation.22 True, in some situations a majority group member or an entire
majority group may be unaware or lack understanding of this harm. But
when confronted with that information, what is the response? In the cur-
rent Washington team situation, the response is to refuse to change the
trademarks.
Prior to the challenge raised by several Native American protestors in
1992,23 there was little useful information as to whether or how the Lan-
ham Act might protect non-majority populations from harm based upon
trademarks. Still, they raised two arguments. First, the Washington team
marks were scandalous, which prohibits registration of marks offensive to a
20. See, e.g., Peter Keating, What’s in a name?, ESPN (June 27, 2014), available at http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9540075/dan-snyder-refuses-change-washington-redskins-mascot-
espn-magazine; see also Alicia Jessop, Inside the Legal Fight to Change the Washington Redskins’
Name, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/10/
15/a-look-at-the-legal-fight-to-change-the-washington-redskins-name/; Tim Devaney, What’s
in a name? Dumping ‘Redskins’ could have a major financial impact, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Oct.
17, 2013), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/17/renaming-the-
redskins-could-have-a-major-financial/?page=all; Michelle FlorCruz, Redskins Name Trademark
Canceled: The Whole NFL Could Lose Millions, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 18, 2014), available at
http://www.ibtimes.com/redskins-name-trademark-canceled-whole-nfl-could-lose-millions-
1605022. The economics argument was part of the laches argument raised against the first can-
cellation petition filed against the Washington team’s trademarks. See, e.g., Pro Football, Inc. v.
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 143-44 (D.D.C. 2003). Because of the way that the court construed
the laches argument, it only ran from the time an individual reaches his/her majority. See Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Therefore, the laches defense was
obviated by a new filing with younger Native American petitioners. See Blackhorse v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 2014 TTAB LEXIS 231, at *124-32 (T.T.A.B. June 18, 2014).
21. On this point, the Washington football team’s most recent argument has been that 90
percent of 1,000 Native Americans polled are not offended by the team name. See Keim, supra
note 19. Among his proxies, the argument is made more strongly (even while recognizing that
some are offended). See, e.g., Sean Gregory, A Mysterious Defense of the Washington Redskins
Name, TIME (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/10/11/a-
mysterious-defense-of-the-washington-redskins-name/. And then there are those who make the
argument more forcefully, stridently, and offensively. I choose not to air their offensive tirades,
but they are easily found on the Internet.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. Harjo v. Pro Football, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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substantial composite of the general public at the time of registration.24
Possibly, the petitioners believed that the “substantial composite of the
general public” requirement could be satisfied by one small group, Native
Americans. Although unlikely in modern jurisprudence,25 it occasionally
happened in the past. Otherwise, it is unclear why they raised the scandal-
ous objection as it is doubtful that they could prove that a substantial com-
posite of non-Native Americans in relevant time periods were offended by
the racial slur against Native Americans. The inability to count on non-
Native Americans supporting their scandalous claim is particularly stark
given not only our historical treatment of Native Americans, but also be-
cause Native Americans comprise such a small percentage of the American
population.26 Without support from other people in the general popula-
tion, Native American voices are not sufficient to succeed in a scandalous
prohibition argument.
Second, the petitioners also argued that the marks were disparag-
ing—a registration prohibition that was very unclear in scope at the time
but seemed like it might have some power.27 Over the long and tortured
course of this dispute, the scope of disparaging has been clarified but in
ways that undermine the necessary protection for non-majority groups.
This problem may stem from the faulty premise that these two prohibitions
are parallel in scope, purpose, and justification. In fact, such parallels di-
minish the protection afforded non-majority groups when the sensibilities
of the majority are not offended. While not easily remedied, it would help
to refocus the disparaging prohibition, when applied to claims based on
identity or religious issues, on ameliorating harm caused by reinforcing
stereotypes and bias.
24. See id.
25. Recent decisions affirm that a single market segment is insufficient to constitute the
requisite substantial composite of the general population. See, e.g., In re Brunetti, 2014 WL
3976439 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014).
26. According to the 2010 Census, there are 5.2 million Native Americans (including
Alaska Natives) in the United States, which is .9% of the total American population. See Tina
Norris, Paula L. Vines, & Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, The American Indian and Alaskan Native Popula-
tion: 2010 Census Briefs, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
10.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census Data, available at http://www.census.gov/2010cen
sus/data/.
27. Periodically, including in the Washington team’s dispute, First Amendment objections
are raised. To date, such concerns have been rejected because of the limited scope of the federal
registration system and the fact that any such marks can continue to be used and protected under
the common law. See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re McGinley, 660
F.2 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). This Article will not address the First Amendment concerns.
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I. MORALITY IN TRADEMARK ACQUISITION
When an entity, whether an individual, a company, a partnership, or
the like, has a new product (good or service)28 to offer for sale, it needs a
symbol. This symbol will identify for the consumer the source of the prod-
uct and give the consumer information about the product itself.29 For ex-
ample, after buying and drinking a Coca-Cola soda, the consumer can
identify that product in the future by simply looking for the COCA-
COLA trademark on a soda. That trademark denotes that the source of the
soda is the same as the prior source.30 It also provides information for the
consumer regarding the expected quality and experiential characteristics of
the product because the consumer can use the trademark to find the prod-
uct previously described or experienced.31 Consequently, trademark law is
commonly seen as a species of unfair competition law, a means for protect-
ing consumers from deception.32
Several types of symbols are prohibited or limited from being trade-
marks because they undermine the ability of the symbol to serve its unfair
competition purpose. For example, a symbol is prohibited from becoming
a trademark for a particular product if it is deceptive, meaning that it seems
to describe a characteristic of the product that would influence the buyer’s
purchasing decision, but in fact that product does not have that characteris-
tic.33 As it tricks the consumer into buying the product, a deceptive mark
would provide an unfair advantage.34 Because trademark protection began
in the common law, these concerns were captured by common law juris-
prudence.35 When Congress created a federal trademark system, which
supplements rather than supplants common law protection, it captured
many of those same prohibitions and restrictions.36
28. Trademarks actually denote a symbol associated with goods, and service marks denote
symbols associated with services. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2014). For the purpose of this
Article and as in common parlance, the term trademark will be used throughout to encompass
both trademarks and service marks.
29. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION §2:3 (4th ed., 2014).
30. See id.
31. See id. at §2:5.
32. See id. at §2:1; ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §1.03 (2014).
33. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2014); see, e.g., Daesang Corp. v. Rhee Bros., Inc., 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9066, at *31-35 (D. Md. May 13, 2005).
34. See, e.g., Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 528 (1903).
35. See MCCARTHY, supra note 29, §3:1; There is some suggestion that deceptive marks,
marks that appear to describe the associated products but in fact do not, were perceived as im-
moral. See WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND
ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS (FIRM-NAMES, BUSINESS-SIGNS, GOOD-WILL, LABELS, & C.) 238-39
(Little, Brown, and Co. 1873).
36. In the current trademark act, most, although not all, of the relevant restrictions and
prohibitions can be found in 15 U.S.C. §1052 (2014).
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However, there are two prohibitions that appear to have little United
States common law antecedent: scandalous and disparaging. Neither of
these prohibitions, on their face, relate to concerns of unfair competition.
Instead, they appear to have some sort of moral or public order justifica-
tion. This fundamental difference renders the considerations used to shape
other prohibitions inapplicable. Because they lack precedent in common
law jurisprudence or clear connective tissue with other prohibitions, their
respective scopes have been defined in their application and in light of each
other.
A. Scandalous Registration Prohibition
In the 1905 Trademark Act,37 Congress first included a prohibition
against registering marks that consist of or comprise immoral or scandalous
matter. Apparently added at the last minute to the legislation, the direct
legislative history provides little express information regarding Congress’
intent in enacting this prohibition nor its expected parameters. However,
there are some useful hints. Similar prohibitions related to immorality were
proposed previously,38 and at least one early legal commentator believed
immorality to be a viable argument against trademark acquisition under
prior acts.39 There is other indirect, relevant legislative history evidencing
the Senate’s exposure to various international trademark laws before 1900,
many of which contained a similar prohibition.40 By 1900, the Commis-
sion appointed to revise our trademark law also considered many foreign
trademark laws, presumably to evaluate what provisions may be incorpo-
rated into U.S. law.41 In 1902, the Commissioners presented alternative
proposals precluding trademark protection based upon immorality, includ-
ing one proposal that contained the precise language adopted in 1905.42
It was decades before administrative decisions and courts began to
interpret the scandalous prohibition by considering if it “would be shock-
37. Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 725.
38. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 52-1860, at 3 (1892) (suggesting limiting registration to
“marks and labels . . . as are not offensive to public sentiment or morals.”).
39. BROWNE, supra note 35, at 239; see also Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co., 205 F. 302,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
40. Jasmine Abdel-khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analo-
gous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 198-99 (2007); see, e.g., S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 52-149, at 495 (1893); S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 52-8, pt. 2 at 354, 357, 359 (1891); S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 51-177, at 1-2 (1890); S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 51-57, at 60 illus. (1890). The
U.S. also joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1887, which
allowed treaty members to reject trademark registrations if contrary to morals and to public
order. 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
paris/index.html; see also H.R. REP. NO. 50-3281, at 5 (1890).
41. S. DOC. NO. 56-20, at 40-43, 55 (1902).
42. See id. at 66, 130.
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ing to the sense of propriety or call out condemnation.”43 Eventually, re-
viewing bodies developed a two-part test for scandalous: (1) determine the
likely meaning of the mark in the context of the associated goods or ser-
vices in the application, any other elements in the mark, and the market-
place; and (2) evaluate if a substantial composite (not necessarily a
majority) of the general public would find the mark to be scandalous based
upon attitudes contemporary to the application.44 Over the decades, this
prohibition has been assessed for marks that fall into the following catego-
ries:45 (1) political imagery;46 (2) religious terms and icons;47 (3) identity
issues involving race, gender, and sexual orientation;48 (4) sexual matter
43. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938). Although some
have tried to analogize scandalous trademarks and obscenity, reviewing bodies specifically have
held that they are not comparable because there is a lower threshold for objectionable material
under scandalous as compared to obscenity. See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485-86
(C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *2  (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014).
44. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485; see also In re Red Bull GmbH, 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 136, at *18 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2006) (affirming refusal of BULLSHIT for various drinks
(alcoholic and non-alcoholic) and various services as scandalous).
45. See Abdel-khalik, supra note 40, at 200-10; see also Stephen R. Baird, Moral Interven-
tion in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TMR
661, 701-28 (1993).
46. See, e.g., In re Advanced Armament Corp. LLC, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 601 (T.T.A.B.
Nov. 29, 2013) (reversing refusal of ADVANCED ARMAMENT CORP. SILENCERS with a
Statue of Liberty design holding a gun with silencer for firearms); In re Old Glory Condom
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (reversing refusal of OLD GLORY CON-
DOM CORP and flag/condom design for condoms); Ex parte Marta Maid Mfg. Co. 37
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (Comm’r Pats. 1938) (affirming refusal of QUEEN MARY (and design)
for underwear); Ex parte Banner Cigar Mfg. Co., 1909 C.D. 9 (affirming refusal to register the
portrait and signature of Grover Cleveland for cigars).
47. See, e.g., In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(reversing refusal to register MOONIES and design for a pants-dropping doll); In re Waughtel,
138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (reversing refusal to register AMISH with a picture of
a man smoking a cigar for cigars and cigar boxes); In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 122
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (affirming refusal to register SENUSSI for cigarettes); In
re Sociedade Agricola E. Comercial Dos Vinhos Messias, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275 (T.T.A.B.
1968) (affirming refusal of MESSIAS for wine and brandy); In re P.J. Valckenberg, 122 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (affirming refusal of MADONNA for wines); Ex parte Summit
Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22 (Comm’r Pats. 1943) (affirming refusal of
AGNUS DEI (and picture) for metallic tabernacle safes); In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d
at 328 (affirming refusal of MADONNA for wine).
48. See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 337 (T.T.A.B. June 14, 2013) (affirming
refusal for PROTECT THE COOCH! for various types of clothing); In re Love Bottling Co.,
2005 TTAB LEXIS 261 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2005) (affirming refusal to register W.B. WIFE
BEATER for T-shirts); In re Mothers and Fathers Italian Ass’n, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 52
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2000) (reversing refusal of MAFIA BRAND for various foods); In re Undeas,
Inc., 2000 TTAB LEXIS 39 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2000) (reversing refusal of JUNIOR M.A.F.I.A.
for musical tapes/discs and concerts/performances); In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443
(T.T.A.B. 1971) (affirming refusal of BUBBY TRAP for bras); see also Bromberg v. Carmel Self
Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (denying motions to dismiss for opposi-
tion to ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE HAND
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(vulgar);49 (5) profanity (vulgar);50 and (6) illegality.51 These categories are
for restaurant services); see also DYKES ON BIKES, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/
281,746 (filed July 31, 2003); Office Action from Sharon A. Meier, Trademark Attorney, to
Brooke Oliver (Feb. 20, 2004).  The opposition to DYKES ON BIKES was eventually dismissed
on standing grounds. See McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240
Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49. See, e.g., In re Blvd. Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003); (affirming refusal to
register 1-800-JACK-OFF for adult-oriented phone conversations); In re Mavety Media Grp., 33
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (remanding after vacating refusal of BLACK TAIL for an adult en-
tertainment magazine); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 481 (affirming refusal for a mark comprised
of a photograph of a nude man and woman kissing while male genitalia appears to be exposed
for a sex related newsletter and social club services); In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (affirming refusal to
register COCK SUCKER and design for rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops); In re Manwin/RK
Collateral Trust, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 270 (T.T.A.B. July 3, 2014) (affirming refusal for MOM-
SBANGTEENS for adult-oriented web site services); In re Betty Bangs, LLC, 2013 TTAB
LEXIS 383 (T.T.A.B. July 9, 2013) (affirming refusal of I BANGED BETTY for various types
of clothing); In re Mackman, 2011 WL 810206 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 9, 2011) (reversing refusal to
register COCKTALES for a variety of entertainment services); In re RK Netmedia, Inc., 2009
TTAB LEXIS 389 (T.T.A.B. May 21, 2009) (affirming refusal of CUMFIESTA and CUM-
GIRLS for adult oriented internet material); In re Shearer, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 374 (T.T.A.B.
May 14, 2009) (affirming refusal of PUSSY NATURAL ENERGY (and design) for various
non-alcoholic drinks); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1581 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 9, 2008) (sustaining opposition to SEX ROD and design for various types
of clothing); In re Carlson, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 651 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2007) (affirming refusal
of YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL for clothing); In re Douglas and Watson, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 7, 2004) (affirming refusal of THE BEARDED CLAM for restaurant services);
In re Wilcher Corp., 1996 TTAB LEXIS 28 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 1996) (affirming refusal for
DICK HEADS! and design for restaurant/bar services); In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (reversing the refusal of BIG PECKER BRAND for T-shirts); In re
Thomas Lab., Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (reversing refusal of a drawn pic-
ture of a “cartoon-like representation of a melancholy, unclothed male figure ruefully contem-
plating an unseen portion of his genitalia” for a corrective implement to increase penis size); In re
Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (reversing refusal of WEEK-END SEX for
a magazine); Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (P.T.O. 1952) (reversing refusal
of LIBIDO for perfumes and toilet water).
50. See, e.g., In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014) (affirming refusal
to register FUCT, treated as the phonetic equivalent of fucked, for athletic apparel, children’s
apparel, and infant’s apparel); In re Michalko, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949 (T.T.A.B. 2014)
(affirming refusal of ASSHOLE REPELLENT for a gag gift can with spray top); In re Murchi-
son, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 130 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2014) (affirming refusal of FOK’N HURTS
for stun guns); In re Jones, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 615 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (affirming refusal
of NO $#!+ for a website featuring news, humor, and memes); In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc.,
107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2059 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2013) (affirming refusal of AWSHIT WORKS
for various hats, caps, and types of clothing); In re Luxuria, s.r.o., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2011) (affirming refusal of bottle in shape of a hand with upward middle
finger design for various alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks); In re Jibjab Media, Inc., 2009
TTAB LEXIS 67 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2009) (affirming refusal of A-HOLE PATROL for an online
joke forum); In re Mexico 69 SRL, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 358 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2006) (affirming
refusal of DE PUTA MADRE for various types of clothing); In re Red Bull GmbH, 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 136 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2006) (affirming refusal of BULLSHIT for various types of
drinks and services); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (af-
firming refusal of BULLSHIT for various accessories like handbags and wallets); In re Watkins,
SPRING 2015] Disparaging Trademarks 297
not absolute or exclusive. For example, some marks that contain gendered
material easily cross categories and may be treated as falling into one of the
vulgar categories (sexual matter or profanity).52
As with other bases for objection, in situations where there is doubt
as to whether the mark is scandalous, doubt is resolved in favor of the
applicant.53 Even if it passes the examination process, the application may
still have other hurdles to overcome before registration, such as publication
for opposition (where a third party may object based on scandalousness)
and filing an acceptable statement of use if it was an intent-to-use applica-
tion. Even registration does not guarantee that the mark is inviolate. After
registration, scandalousness can be raised by third parties in a petition to
cancel the registered mark.54
Of the recent scandalous rejections affirmed by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (Board), the majority appear to fall within one of the
two vulgar categories.55 This suggests that applicants are testing the
boundary between permissible double entendres/jokes and vulgarity. Al-
ternatively, applicants may be pushing to see if contemporary attitudes no
longer consider certain terms to be offensive. Moreover, many applicants,
especially those without experienced trademark counsel, may not be aware
2005 TTAB LEXIS 66 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2005) (reversing refusal of TWATTY GIRL for
cartoons); In re Zaharoni, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 3 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 4, 2005) (affirming refusal of
THE COMPLETE A**HOLE’S GUIDE TO for a series of self-help books); In re Douglas and
Watson, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 7, 2004) (affirming refusal of THE
BEARDED CLAM for restaurant services); In re Frankel, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 250 (T.T.A.B.
Mar. 29, 2002) (affirming refusal of GRANDMA SCHITTHED’S OUTHOUSE BROWN,
GRANDPA SCHITTHED’S INKY STINKY PALE ALE, and SCHITTHED’S for various
alcoholic drinks, restaurant services, T-shirts, and hats); In re Friggin Barnyard, 1999 TTAB
LEXIS 108 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 1999) (affirming refusal of FRIGGIN and design for decorative
refrigerator magnets); In re Bad Frog Brewery, Inc., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 86 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 16,
1999) (reversing refusal for BAD FROG BEER and design for beer); In re R.G.S. Group, Ltd.,
1997 TTAB LEXIS 293 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 1997) (affirming refusal of REALLY GOOD SHIT
for oil); The Greyhound Corp. vs. Both Worlds, Inc. d.b.a. The Wild Berry, 1988 TTAB
LEXIS 78 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 1988) (granting summary judgment in opposition that dog defe-
cating for T-shirts would be scandalous and disparaging); In re Leo Quan, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (reversing refusal of BADASS for stringed musical instruments).
51. See, e.g., In re Kirby, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 156 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 22, 2008) (affirming
refusal of COCAINE and design for soft and energy drinks); Schlage Lock Co. v. Staiano, 2005
TTAB LEXIS 846 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2005) (dismissing opposition to KRYPTOKING and
(allegedly aloe) design for sunglasses, bags, wallets, various types of clothing, and various goods
related to tobacco and smoking); In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972)
(affirming refusal on other grounds of ACAPULCO GOLD for suntan lotion).
52. See, e.g., In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439 (noting that the term in Serial No. 85/
310, 960 was treated as vulgar/sexual term even though it may also be used in the context of
extreme misogyny, nihilism, or violence).
53. In re Watkins, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 66, at *12-13.
54. 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) (2015).
55. Responding to the argument that the term bullshit is more freely used, “[that fact]
does not render them any the less profane.” In re Tinseltown, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 866.
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of the scandalous prohibition for vulgar terms. And finally, the fact that
vulgarity objections dominate scandalous decisions may also reflect the rise
of disparagement as a viable argument for certain marks previously consid-
ered under the scandalous prohibition, such as religious terms and terms
related to identity issues.
B. The Legislative Development of the Disparaging Prohibition
Although the scandalousness prohibition was enacted with the 1905
Trademark Act, the Quakers must have felt that it was insufficient for their
purposes in 1914.56 In arguing for the proposed legislation to criminalize
the use of religious organizations’ names and nicknames as trademarks, the
Chairman of the Friends Legislative Board, Mr. Nicholson, stated that
goods should be purchased based on the merits of the goods, and “not
upon the merit of some name, especially if that name has been taken from
a denominational body, the use of which in the markets of the world tends
to bring into disrepute the denomination that carries the name.”57 In so argu-
ing, Mr. Nicholson raised a sort of unfair competition argument—that the
company is exploiting or riding the coattails of the Quakers’ good name.
But more importantly, he contended, the Quakers did not want their
nickname used for commercial purposes.58
A similar line of reasoning was raised decades later against trademarks
for other religious terms, but concerns about commercialization of reli-
gions terms or iconography have lost popularity or success or both.59
There are at least two reasons for this. The first is that there may be an
increasing acceptance of religious terms for some items, particularly items
used by religious clergy. For example, it seems unlikely that a substantial
composite of the general population in today’s society would be offended
by an AGNEUS DEI mark used for metallic tabernacle safes purchased and
used by Catholic clergy; and yet, a 1943 decision affirmed refusal of the
registration because it was offensive, at that time, to commercialize “highly
sacred religious” emblems.60 Second, parties may be more successful rais-
ing the claim under a more narrowly tailored prohibition that does not
require assessing the general public’s perception, avoiding reliance on the
56. According to the U.S.P.T.O. database, The American Cereal Company filed a trade-
mark application for a mark containing “Quaker Oats” in 1897. See QUAKER OATS 1
POUND QUAKER OATS MANUFACTURED BY THE AMERICAN CEREAL CO. AD-
DRESS CHICAGO U.S.A. USE ONLY QUAKER BRAND ROLLED OATS, US Trade-
mark Reg. No. 29,632 (filed Jan. 15, 1897 and expired Dec. 22, 1988). The American Cereal
Company was eventually rolled into a parent company, Quaker Oats Co. See OHIO HISTORY
CENTRAL, American Cereal Company, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/American_Cereal_
Company?rec=833.
57. Hearings on Use of Religious Org. Names, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 10, 18.
59. See cases cited, supra note 47.
60. Ex Parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22.
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fickleness of the general public to catch terms or usage offensive to
others.61 Such a prohibition did not exist in the 1905 Act—even though
some of the mid-20th century scandalous decisions stretch to accommo-
date concerns of offending some religious organizations.62
In the late 1930s, Representative Fritz Lanham spearheaded the pro-
cess of entirely rewriting our federal trademark registration system. The
initial proposed legislation contained the prohibition on scandalous mate-
rial but nothing related to disparaging.63 In a 1938 hearing, various speak-
ers raised a concern that the proposed limitation on using the portrait or
signature of a living individual or the name, portrait, or signature of any
deceased President during the life of his widow was wholly insufficient.64
The Commissioner of Patents, who also had authority over the federal
trademark system, stated shock to his sense of propriety at three recent
trademark applications: upon Mr. Rockne’s death, KNUTE ROCKNE
for whisky and alcoholic beverages, the Duchess of Windsor’s name for
brassieres and underwear, and NOTRE DAME for alcoholic beverages.65
Another speaker, attorney Edward Rogers, also noted that some may be
“prostituting great names” and obtaining “vicarious credit to goods by
putting a great man’s name on them.”66 One solution suggested was a
prohibition on marks that “bring into disrepute or ridicule anyone in the
place of community he resides.”67
Perhaps because these concerns related to individuals or institutions,
the House of Representatives passed a bill in 1939 that now included a
prohibition against “matter which tends to disparage persons, living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or to bring them into con-
tempt.”68 In a subsequent hearing, a commentator again raised concerns
about improper use of prior presidents’ names, images, or the like as trade-
marks even after the widow has died (and thus not precluded under the
61. See, e.g., Hearings on Use of Religious Org. Names, supra note 1, at 13, 16; see also In re In
Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (reversing refusal to register
MOONIES and design for a pants-dropping doll on the basis of scandalousness).
62. For example, the T.T.A.B. found SENUSSI scandalous for cigars because the Senussi
are a Muslim sect that forbids the use of cigarettes. Allowing the trademark would be offensive to
members of that religious organization, which was the reference group to determine scandalous
rather than the general public. See In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339
(T.T.A.B. 1959).
63. See Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, Subscommittee on Trade-
Marks, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 9041].
64. See id. at 79-81. Both years, these concerns were raised to suggest an amendment of
§2(c), but the ensuing conversation brought the issue back to §2(a) disparagement.
65. See id. at 79.
66. See id. at 79, 81.
67. See id. at 80.
68. See H. JOURNAL, 76th Cong., Sess. 1, at 877, 883 (1939).
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proposed section that directly addresses dead Presidents).69 Referring to
the disparaging/contempt language recently added as well as the scandal-
ousness prohibition, it was suggested that these prohibitions allowed the
USPTO to strike the right balance between preventing abuses and al-
lowing legitimate uses.70 ABRAHAM LINCOLN gin would not be per-
missible, but GEORGE WASHINGTON for coffee would be.71 The
speaker evidently believed it would be self-evident why one would be dis-
paraging and the other not, perhaps having to do with lingering concern
over alcohol.72
In discussing various potential issues addressed (or not addressed) by
the disparaging prohibition, commentators raised a salient concern: the
scope of disparagement.73 For example, one commentator contested the
notion that an ex-President’s name should be used as a trademark even in a
“respectful manner.”74 The Assistant Commissioner of Patents subse-
quently suggested that “disparaging” would be too difficult for the
USPTO because it would be a matter of the relevant individuals’ personal
opinion as to whether something is disparaging.75
And yet, the term “disparage” did not change in subsequent bills. In
1942, the relevant portion of the bill was amended in two ways. First,
“tends to disparage” was changed to “may disparage.”76 Second, the bill
inserted after “may disparage” the additional prohibition against “falsely
suggest[ing] a connection with.”77 The second amendment was likely to
address the concern that unscrupulous businesses would attempt to unfairly
gain the benefit of others’ good name by using the others’ names as trade-
marks.78 The first amendment, however, reaffirms that disparagement re-
mained an essential concern outside of merely protecting individual names.
It also suggests that disparagement was intended to have broader scope (in
at least one facet) than either scandalousness or its own original formula-
tion. The scandalousness prohibition applies when the matter consists or
comprises of scandalous material; so, it must cross the threshold of being
scandalous. Originally, disparagement would have prohibited registration if
69. See Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, Subscommittee on Trade-
Marks, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4744].
70. See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 69, at 19, 20.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Prohibition had just ended on December 5, 1933 with ratification of the Twenty-First
Amendment to the Constitution.
73. See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 69, at 20-21.
74. See id. at 21.
75. See id.
76. H. JOURNAL, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 541 (1942).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., In re W.H. Snyder & Sons Inc., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (T.T.A.B. 1963)
(noting that HOUSE OF WINDSOR for cigars would be prohibited regardless of whether the
applicant uses the mark in a “dignified” manner without intent to deceive).
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the matter tends to disparage. “Tends to” was defined around that time as
“to move, direct, or develop one’s course in a particular direction; to ex-
hibit an inclination or tendency.”79 Already broader than scandalous, the
original formulation would have prohibited a mark as long as it was in the
direction of disparaging. By changing it to “may disparage,” Congress fur-
ther loosened the requirement, suggesting that a mark should be prohib-
ited as long as there is a possibility or probability of disparagement.80 Of
course, this still leaves open the question of what disparagement means.
None of the subsequent Lanham Act legislative history provides further
evidence of congressional intent, leaving its development to the adminis-
trative and court process.
C. The Pre-Harjo Disparaging Decisions
Although the Harjo dispute81 changed the landscape of disparaging
trademarks, there were prior disparagement decisions. However, they were
inconsistent and provided little guidance as to the contours of
disparagement.
Unlike the scandalous prohibition, which, for right or wrong,
seemed to put decision-makers more at ease with respect to its meaning,
the initial decisions raising the disparaging prohibition reflected uncer-
tainty in how to construct what disparaging means in the context of the
statutory language. Perhaps this uncertainty also explains why the first re-
ported decision is one where the Patent Examiner in Chief appears to have
raised the issue of disparagement sua sponte, 1951’s Doughboy Industries, Inc.
v. The Reese Chemical Company.82
Arguing likelihood of confusion, Doughboy Industries opposed an
application for DOUGH-BOY for “a prophylactic preparation for the pre-
vention of venereal diseases” based on Doughboy Industries’ use and regis-
trations of DOUGHBOY for various food products.83 The term “Dough-
boy” is slang for American soldiers in World War I. Finding no likelihood
of confusion, the Patent Examiner in Chief then raised the issue of dispar-
agement and, with minimal analysis, held that it is disparaging to associate
DOUGHBOY, and presumably our American soldiers, with venereal dis-
ease treatments.84 In so finding, the Patent Examiner in Chief must have
79. Tend, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/tend (2014).
80. May, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/may (2014).
81. Although this cancellation action ended on a laches argument, and Amanda
Blackhorse and others filed the currently active petition to cancel, I will use Harjo to refer to
both disputes by Native Americans against the Washington team marks.
82. 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (Pat. Off. Exm’r-in-Chief 1951).
83. Id.
84. The analysis is essentially comprised of the following sentence: “When used by appli-
cant on its particular goods, the mark obviously ‘consists or comprises * * * matter which may
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believed that the collective “doughboy” term constituted either persons or
a national symbol.
Interestingly, the concern raised by associating American soldiers
with venereal diseases parallels a later matter, where an Examiner rejected
an application associating an American flag mark with condoms.85 In the
later matter, however, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) re-
lied upon the scandalous prohibition. Perhaps the Patent Examiner in
Chief used the disparaging prohibition for DOUGHBOY because the
mark triggers a specific entity or group of people, and the statutory lan-
guage suggested a connection between disparaging and offense to individ-
uals. The Patent Examiner in Chief seemed to find disparagement because
he presumed the targeted group would be embarrassed or otherwise not
want to be associated with the identified goods and services. The Gavel
Club likewise successfully raised disparagement against the collective mark
GAVEL CLUBS AN AFFILIATION OF TOASTMASTERS INTER-
NATIONAL (and design) because it would be used, in part, for clubs in
penal and mental institutions, which “might well disparage [Gavel Club]
and its members, past and present.”86
Some attempted to create clearer criteria regarding what it means to
disparage. For some decisions, the latter part of the disparagement statu-
tory language, “matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute,”87 became an essential part of the analysis.88 The initial step,
therefore, would be determining who or what is disparaged and ensure
that that person or entity fits within the definition of persons, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols.89 Additionally, the decision-maker may re-
quire evidence that the trademark application clearly incorporates a trade-
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols . . . or bring them into . . . contempt, or disrepute.’” Id.
85. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
86. Gavel Club v. Toastmasters Int’l, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88 (T.T.A.B. 1960). This case
also evidences some of the early, common confusion, where the analysis of disparagement mixed
with the false association portion of §2(a).
87. 15 U.S.C. §1052(a).
88. See, e.g., In re Consol. Foods Corp., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 63 (1975) (finding OSS,
the predicate to the CIA, is not a national symbol); Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The Reese Chem.
Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (1951); Jacobs v. Int’l Multifoods Corp., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
165 (1981) (finding BOSTON TEA PARTY is neither a belief nor national symbol in the
context of a false connection argument).
89. See Gavel Club, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88 (determining that Gavel Club constitutes an
institution for purposes of disparagement); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. J. Halpern Co., 133
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 625 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (finding that Wells Fargo is not an institution, defined as
“an organization or foundation, for the exercise of some public purpose or function, as an asy-
lum or a university”).
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mark previously (and recognizably) associated with another entity.90 For
example, the TTAB reversed a refusal to register a mark with a confederate
flag as disparaging or falsely suggesting a connection with The Sons of the
Confederate Veterans because of insufficient resemblance between the
marks.91 Others defined disparagement as occurring when a new trade-
mark damaged the reputation of a senior trademark holder with the same
or similar mark.92 Although the damage could be described as damage to
senior trademark user’s mark or products, at least one decision-maker re-
turned to a DOUGHBOY-like reasoning, simply evaluating if the new
trademark user’s products would be so repugnant to the senior user as to
harm the senior user’s products.93 The doctrine was shaped by an interest-
ing fact; most of the pre-Harjo cases were brought by corporate or similar
institutions to protect themselves.94 As such, they have significantly differ-
ent interests at play as compared to marks opposed because of identity or
religious issues.
Of the pre-Harjo cases related (broadly) to identity or religious issues,
most were perfunctory.95 In the late 1960s, an applicant attempted to reg-
ister design mark comprised of an “X” over the Soviet hammer and sickle
for patriotic educational services, namely, dissemination of information
about U.S. laws concerning Communist Party activities.96 The bulk of the
90. See, e.g., Fanta v. The Coca-Cola Co., 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 674 (T.T.A.B. 1964)
(suggesting that the petitioner has no grounds to argue false connection or disparagement be-
cause his name FANTA has no recognition in the field); Gavel Club, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88
(requiring evidence that opposer was an institution with a propriety interest in its name and that
someone was subsequently seeking to register a mark that would disparage or falsely suggest a
connection); see also Int’l Playtex Corp. v. Lever Bros. Co., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (T.T.A.B.
1969) (requiring evidence that some in the purchasing public would associate the two marks, at
least in part because the senior user’s mark was well-known).
91. See In re Am. Indus., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 60 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
92. See, e.g., Int’l Playtex Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306.
93. See Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Record Chem. Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (finding nothing offensive to NASA in the applicant’s moth pre-
ventative-air fresheners). For a time, decision-makers also struggled with standing. See, e.g.,
Abraham’s Seed v. John One Ten, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (1986); Bromberg et al v. Carmel
Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978). This issue was resolved in Ritchie v.
Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that an individual had standing to oppose O.J.
Simpson marks as scandalous).
94. See, e.g., K2 Corp. v. Phillip Morris, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 174 (Aug. 14, 1976); Nat’l
Aeronautics and Space Admin., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563; In re Am. Indus., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 60; Wells Fargo & Co., 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 625; Gavel Club, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88.
95. See, e.g., Abraham’s Seed, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (decision standing not the
merits).
96. See In re Anti-communist World Freedom Cong., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 304
(T.T.A.B. 1969) (rejecting argument that the hammer and sickle is a symbol of the International
Communist Congress rather than a national symbol of the U.S.S.R.).
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short analysis focused on whether another country’s national symbol is
included in Section 2(a) protection; it is and the rejection was affirmed.97
In those matters that focused on religion or racial identity, the refus-
als to register were all reversed. The TTAB reversed the refusal to register
JAP for clothing, argued as offensive to those of Japanese ancestry by the
Japanese American Citizens League.98 The decision intimated that the
term could not be disparaging because the company was controlled by
someone of Japanese origin.99 It is unclear why the TTAB expected some-
one from Japan to know whether a term is an American slur.100 In In re In
Over Our Heads, Inc., the TTAB reversed a refusal to register MOONIES
(and design suggesting a buttocks) for dolls that drop their pants; the term
“Moonies” is a slur applied to members of a small religion often called a
cult.101 In the years after Harjo was filed but before a merits decision issued,
an examiner also rejected BUDDA BEACHWEAR and logo for clothing
as being disparaging.102 In reversing the refusal, the TTAB noted that the
determination in this case is “highly subjective . . . ‘perhaps being all the
more subjective due to the relative obscurity of Buddhism in this coun-
try.’”103 In other words, few appeals focused on identity or religion issues,
and those that did failed. It is not until the Harjo case that the TTAB and
courts finally articulated a clear test for the disparaging prohibition for
non-corporate entities.104
97. Id.
98. In re Condas S.A., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
99. Id.
100. The decision also pointed to another case as holding that the term is not derogatory.
See Japanese Am. Citizens League v. Takada, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
However, the decision seemed to turn more on the notion that there is no claim available for
“injury to petitioners’ feelings.” Id. The court also argued that, by using the term, Takada was
enhancing and popularizing the term, an argument raised by others in modern cases with some
success. Id.
101. See 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653; see also infra notes 162-70.
102. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994). Despite the misspelling of
Buddha, the logo strongly suggests an intent to refer to Buddha.
103. Id.
104. In the modern era, most claims brought under disparagement are related to religion
and identity issues, and that is the focus of this Article. However, a separate test is sometimes used
when a corporation claims that another trademark disparages that company. In the paradigmatic
and seminal case, The Greyhound Corporation claimed disparagement by a mark for shirts con-
sisting of a greyhound-shaped dog shadow defecating. See The Greyhound Corp. vs. Both
Worlds, Inc. d.b.a. The Wild Berry, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 78 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 1988) (stating
that disparagement is “essentially a violation of one’s right of privacy—the right to be ‘let alone’
from contempt or ridicule.”). Apparently based on the distinct claim of commercial disparagement,
the two pronged test created by the T.T.A.B. for a corporate claim of disparagement is: “(1) that
the communication reasonably would be understood as referring to the plaintiff and (2) that the
communication is disparaging, that is, would be considered offensive or objectionable by a rea-
sonable person of ordinary sensibilities.” Id. (citing Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop,
Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1018, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). Despite the fact that it seems to be
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II. THE DISPUTE OVER THE WASHINGTON TEAM MARKS AND ITS
IMPACT ON DISPARAGEMENT
In 1992, seven Native Americans filed a petition to cancel the Wash-
ington team’s marks as both scandalous and disparaging to Native Ameri-
cans.105 These marks vary from simple word marks, including
WASHINGTON R__S___S, R__S___S, and R__S___ETTES, to marks
combining Washington team words with a portrait of a Native American
in profile or the profile with a spear.106 They were registered between
1967 and 1990.107 Although the Petitioners raised scandalousness, the bulk
of the evidence and the decisions focus on the disparaging prohibition.
The Petitioners argued “r__s___s” arises from a historical setting
where the term was used by Euro-Americans to segregate and subjugate
Native Americans and identify Native Americans as violent savages; even
after the U.S. government began to display more respect towards Native
Americans, the general public continued to “view and portray Native
Americans as ‘simple “savages” whose culture was treated mainly as a
source of amusement for white culture.’”108 Among other evidence and
testimony, each of the Petitioners described situations where the term was
directed at them in a derogatory manner, causing anger and humiliation,
and described how the Washington team’s various marks are insulting,
portray a negative stereotype, and demean women.109
The Respondents argued that, far from being offensive, the r__s___s
term is “[a] neutral and ordinary term of reference” denoting Native
Americans.110 Moreover, because of its long use, the Washington team has
created a secondary meaning for the phrase Washington R__s___s, which
now refers to the professional football team and creates positive, rather
than negative, associations.111 Respondents also argued that the marks
could only be offensive if the products associated with Respondent’s mark
based on an entirely different type of claim, the T.T.A.B. has applied the Greyhound test for other
“corporate” claims of disparagement. See New York Yankees P’ship v. Evil Enter., Inc., 2013
TTAB LEXIS 72 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2013) (sustaining an opposition on non-disparagement
grounds for BASEBALL’S EVIL EMPIRE for clothing); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. and Bryant
v. Pitts and Blackburn, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 370 (T.T.A.B. July 23, 2012) (dismissing an opposi-
tion on numerous grounds for HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA stylized mark for clothing); Boston
Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. P’ship v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 8,
2008) (sustaining the opposition on several grounds, including disparagement, for SEX ROD on
clothing).
105. See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707-08 (T.T.A.B.
1999).
106. See id. at 1741.
107. See id. at 1741.
108. Id. at 1720.
109. See id. at 1723-24.
110. See id. at 1720.
111. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
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are offensive per se or to the referred group’s specific religious/cultural
practices, which is not the case here.112 Respondents next argued that the
term is neutral absent contextual adjectives that create pejorative
phrases.113 According to the Washington team, its trademarks could not
reinforce a stereotype of violence, and any connection with warfare is due
to Native Americans’ “troubled history,” not the term or the team.114
Additionally, in the context of football, the term would not be negative;
rather, the team name reflects “positive attributes of the American Indian
such as dedication, courage and pride.”115 Finally, perhaps assuming that
intent matters, the Washington team argued that its intent in adopting the
mark was purely positive.116
In determining if the marks were disparaging, the TTAB started by
identifying the relevant time period, the time of registration.117 It pro-
ceeded to create the first consistent test for disparagement of identity or
religion. As with scandalousness, the TTAB started by defining the term
“disparage” as it was defined at the time of the legislative enactment:
whether, in relation to persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,
“such matter may dishonor by comparison with what is inferior, slight,
deprecate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust comparison.”118 Then, it
applied a two-step test that directly parallels the scandalousness test: (1)
determine the likely meaning of the matter in question, in relation to
other elements of the mark, the associated products, and the context of the
marketplace; and (2) determine whether that meaning may be disparaging
to a substantial composite of the referenced group (rather than the general
public).119 The TTAB rejected any notion that negative intent was re-
quired because the statutory language included “may.”120 Although it
placed the analytic focus on whether the mark “may be perceived as dis-
paraging,” it also noted that intent to disparage or not disparage could be a
factor.121
112. See id. at 1720-21.




117. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
118. See id. at 1738.
119. See id. at 1738-39.
120. See id. at 1738, 1738 n.100.
121. See id. One recent decision, in the context of national origin, suggests that intent is
highly relevant. In In re Prosynthesis Laboratories, 2012 WL 1267929 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2012),
the T.T.A.B. reversed the refusal to register CHINA FREE (and design) for vitamins and min-
eral supplements. Arguing that it merely provides information that the supplements are not from
China, the T.T.A.B. rejected the argument that it was implying that ingredients from China, and
China itself, are bad. See id. at 7-8. It seemed to seek out evidence of animus or prejudicial intent
as if that was relevant. See id. at 13. Perhaps some of the unexpected conclusions in this case stem
from its blending of the Harjo standard with that of Greyhound. See id. at 13.
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The initial TTAB decision held that the meaning of r__s___s denotes
Native Americans, and the Washington team’s use of Native American
imagery does not detract from that denotation.122 The TTAB found that
the term is not per se disparaging nor are the design elements of the marks,
the Native American profile and the spear.123 However, based on the cu-
mulative effect of the record, the TTAB held for the petitioners, finding
that the Washington team’s marks are disparaging.124 Various subsequent
appellate decisions held that the Petitioners in this case were barred by
laches; they waited too long after reaching the age of majority to bring
their claims.125 In the alternative, the initial appellate decision found that
there was insufficient evidence that, at the time of registration, the marks
were perceived by a substantial composite of Native Americans as disparag-
ing.126 Of course, the solution to the laches problem was to bring a new
petition with younger Native Americans who could file the petition
quickly after reaching the age of majority. That is precisely what hap-
pened, and as of the most recent decision, the Blackhorse petition has led to
the cancellation of the Washington team’s marks.127 The Washington team
has utilized their option to obtain de novo review in federal district court,
which is now pending.128
After the TTAB identified a new disparagement standard in Harjo,
disparagement rejections have apparently increased because the number of
TTAB reviews have increased, and nearly all identity or religious based
cases apply the Harjo two step analysis.129 Additionally, most arguments on
appeal before the TTAB are premised on race/ethnicity/gender or relig-
ious concerns.130 With respect to race or ethnicity, the bulk are claims that
certain terms associated with criminal life, such as “mafia,” harm Italian-
122. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741-42.
123. See id. at 1743.
124. See id. at 1743-48.
125. See Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming decision
that the final Petitioner was barred by laches); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 47-50
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (remanding for appropriate standard in assessing laches for one final Petitioner);
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F.Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that the final Petitioner
was barred by laches); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 136-44 (D.D.C. 2003)
(affirming that laches is an available and applicable defense).
126. See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 113-36.
127. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. June
18, 2014).
128. See Pro-Football v. Blackhorse, 2014 WL 6682640 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2014).
129. In The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Pitts, the T.T.A.B. did not apply
the Harjo standard in assessing whether a stylized version of HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA for
clothing is disparaging. 107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2001 (T.T.A.B. 2013). Instead, it applied the
Greyhound test because the University argued that its commercial interests were at play. Id. at 29.
130. But see In re Prosynthesis Laboratories, 2012 WL 1267929 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2012)
(treated more as a national origin of goods case in reversing the refusal to register CHINA FREE
(and design) for vitamins and mineral supplements).
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Americans; applicants who have appealed these refusals have universally
succeeded.131
The remaining decisions raise interesting issues. In Boswell v. Mavety
Media Group, Anita Boswell and James Clement argued that BLACK TAIL
for adult entertainment magazines was disparaging both because of gender
and at the intersectionality of race and gender.132 Notably, the TTAB
looked extensively to a prior scandalousness decision for this application to
determine the relevant types of evidence.133 While refusing to require
surveys to demonstrate disparagement, an expensive endeavor, the TTAB
allowed the mark to register because the dictionary and ten submitted
magazines were insufficient to prove the offense.134 Another dispute
around SQUAW and SQUAW ONE found most of the applicant’s marks
disparaging except where, due to the associated goods, it may be perceived
as referencing a geographic location for skiing rather than a racial slur
referencing a Native American woman; for the latter, the TTAB reversed
the refusal to register.135 Most recently, an Asian-American band member
applied to register THE SLANTS, arguing that it was, in essence, taking
back the power of a slur against Asians by turning it into something posi-
tive.136 The application was denied. Despite the “good intentions underly-
ing his use of the term,” it was a term that, in context, is perceived as a slur
and offensive by a substantial composite of the targeted group.137 The Fed-
eral Circuit initially affirmed the TTAB’s denial of the application as dis-
131. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2001 (dismissing disparagement
claim on a stylized HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA for clothing); In re Mothers and Fathers Italian
Ass’n, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 52 (reversing refusal of MAFIA BRAND for various foods); In re
Undeas, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 39 (reversing refusal of JUNIOR M.A.F.I.A. for entertainment
services and recordings); Order Sons of Italy in Am. v. The Memphis Mafia, Inc., 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (rejecting that “mafia” in THE MEMPHIS MAFIA
would disparage members of the Order or Italian-Americans); Order Sons of Italy in Am. vs.
Callisi, 1999 WL 450012 (T.T.A.B. June 29, 1999) (dismissing opposition to GOODFELLAS
and design for entertainment services and noting that numerous successful prior oppositions
against MAFIA, MA-FI-O-SO, DON VITO, MAFIA BOB, AND MAFIA FOR MOB all
received judgment by default).
132. See 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. July 28, 1999).
133. See id. Boswell and Clement originally also argued scandalousness but wisely dropped
it.  During the examination process, the USPTO Examiner refused to register the trademark as
scandalous, which was affirmed by the TTAB but reversed by the Federal Circuit in 1994. See In
re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  Despite the length of time, Boswell
and Clement were opposing the same trademark application.
134. See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600.
135. See In re Squaw Valley Development Company, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264
(T.T.A.B. 2006).
136. See In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2013).
137. See id. at 1312.
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paraging, which was then vacated based on “[a] sua sponte request for a
poll on whether to consider this case en banc.”138
Religion also remains a significant basis for objection. Similar to In re
Tam, the TTAB in In re Heeb Media affirmed the refusal to register a maga-
zine aimed at reclaiming a Jewish slur, despite its good intentions, because
the term was so offensive to a substantial composite of the Jewish faith.139
It should be noted that the reclaiming argument may have been successful
at the Examiner level when made in the sexual orientation context.140
A more recent religious-based disparagement case, In re Lebanese Arak
Corporation, returns to a familiar issue in at least two ways. As in the past,
the TTAB assessed the tenets of the referenced religion, affirming the re-
fusal to register KHORAN for wine as the term appears to refer to Islam,
and Muslims are forbidden to drink alcohol.141 Additionally, the dissent
resurrected the question of who matters even within the context of a dis-
paragement claim.142 The majority recognized that disparagement protects
the sensibilities of an ethnic or religious group, many of whom cannot be
adequately protected under the scandalous prohibition because they are
small minorities.143 In determining whether the mark KHORAN would
be seen as identifying the holy Muslim text, the majority opinion looked
to the referenced group’s perception, a decision subsequently questioned
by the dissent as “loading the deck” in ways that will cause the mark to be
rejected as disparaging “despite the fact that most Americans attribute a
different and inoffensive meaning to the mark.”144 Once again, the issue is
whether perceptions of the minority group will be assessed and heard or
whether the majority opinion is all that matters. In this case, the former
garnered more votes.
138. See In re Tam, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6430 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2015), vacated by 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 6840 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015). Although this Article does not address con-
cerns that the disparaging prohibition is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the en banc
review specially added an additional question related to the constitutionality of the disparage-
ment prohibition under the First Amendment. 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6840, at *2.
139. See In re Heeb Media, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 65 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 26, 2008) (affirming
refusal of HEEB for clothing and entertainment).
140. An opposition to DYKES ON BIKES was dismissed on standing. See McDermott v.
San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240 Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal due to lack of standing). Although the Examiner raised disparagement three times dur-
ing prosecution of the application, the mark was allowed to proceed through registration as of
December 5, 2005 after the applicant filed a few things in an ex parte appeal. See Serial No. 78/
281,746, file history (including Office Action dated Feb. 20, 2004, Office Action dated Oct. 28,
2004, and Reconsideration Letter dated May 25, 2005).
141. See In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (af-
firming refusal of KHORAN for alcoholic beverages).
142. See id. at 1216.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1222.
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The applicants in one of the most recent decisions, rejecting STOP
THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA for services related to under-
standing and preventing terrorism, represent a group recognized by the
Southern Poverty Law Center as an Anti-Muslim hate group in New
York.145 The rejection was premised on finding that the phrase is anti-
Muslim and disparaging (connecting Islam and terrorism/violence or per-
haps suggesting that the religion should not be permitted or allowed to
grow in America).146 The applicants lost their appeal, and their petition for
certiorari, partly premised on First Amendment arguments, was denied.147
These cases further developed the notion of context as affecting the
disparagement determination. As noted in the recent Blackhorse TTAB de-
cision, disparaging cases may be treated as falling within one of three cate-
gories: (1) there is an innocuous term that, in context, becomes a
disparaging one; (2) a term that may otherwise seem disparaging may, in
context, be stripped of the offensiveness; and (3) the context may be insuf-
ficient to change the disparaging meaning of the mark.148 Whose context
matters. Without taking into account the strong interests in protecting
members of minority groups, the disparagement claim cannot consistently
serve to protect minority members.
III. DETANGLING THE DISPARAGING PROHIBITION
Because they are the two that do not appear to relate to unfair com-
petition concerns, it is natural to associate the scandalous and disparaging
prohibitions. Doing so, however, can force too much symmetry. Although
the legislative history is sparse, at a minimum, the language changes indi-
cate that disparaging was intended to be a broad protection for those who
need it. More importantly, drawing parallels obfuscates the unique, impor-
tant, and necessary protections of the disparaging prohibition for non-ma-
jority populations.
A. The Practice of Blending Scandalous and Disparaging Registration
Prohibitions
First, the notion of conceptually combining the scandalous and dis-
paraging registration prohibitions began early. In the first reported decision
145. See In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Southern Poverty Law Center, Active
Anti-Muslim Groups, available at http://www.splcenter.org/node/3502/activegroups (2014).
146. See In re Geller, 751 F.3d at 1358-62.
147. See Geller v. PTO, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 220 (Jan. 12, 2015). Although this Article does
not intend to address First Amendment issues, I should note that SOIA bases at least part of its
argument on the belief that its political speech is being chilled. See, e.g., Tony Dutra, Cert Petition
Faults Disparaging Trademark Analysis, Standard in ‘Stop Islamisation’ Case, BNA, (Aug. 18, 2014),
available at http://www.bna.com/cert-petition-faults-n17179894028/.
148. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football Inc., 2014 TTAB LEXIS 231, 29-30 (T.T.A.B. June
18, 2014). Even the Washington team’s expert admitted that some racial terms are inherently
disparaging regardless of context, such as the n-word. See id. at *30 n.43.
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applying the disparaging prohibition, the Examiner in Chief drew parallels
to prior scandalous decisions when describing the criteria for its evalua-
tion, noting that the mark must be assessed in the context of the associated
goods or services.149 Subsequent decisions continued the trend of compar-
ing scandalous decisions with disparaging and vice versa.150
A more troubling indicia of confusion between the scandalous and
disparaging registration prohibition appears in some early decisions involv-
ing religious-based objections to registrations. Some of the earliest deci-
sions applying the scandalous registration prohibition involved marks that
invoked Christianity, a specific group within the larger population. For
example, in 1938, The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the
refusal to register MADONNA for wines on the basis that it would be
scandalous to take “the highest example of the purity of womanhood” and
associate her with wine for drinking.151 The majority opinion even opined
that it would be of “very doubtful propriety” to commercialize the name
or representation of the Virgin Mary at all.152 A later decision reiterated
that commercializing a similar religious symbol, AGNUS DEI with picto-
rial representation, would be offensive to most Christians—even though it
was applied to metallic tabernacle safes used and presumably purchased by
Catholic clergy.153 Perhaps such sensitivity to Christian beliefs and symbols
is understandably characterized as scandalous as even today the majority
religious tradition in the United States remains Christianity by a wide mar-
gin.154 And these decisions occurred before the disparaging prohibition
existed, making scandalous the only option to prohibit the registration.
The problem with mixing the scandalous and disparaging prohibitions be-
comes clearer when the decision-makers were later faced with non-Chris-
tian religious symbols and terms.
The first reported decision to confront non-Christian religious tradi-
tions is In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, involving an application to register
SENUSSI for cigarettes.155 In finding that the mark should be refused re-
gistration, the TTAB stated that
149. See Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227
(1951).
150. See, e.g., Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (P.T.O. 1952) (refer-
ring to the DOUGHBOY decision in assessing whether LIBIDO for perfumes and toilet waters
would be scandalous).
151. See In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
152. See id. at 329. Despite the majority’s position, the dissent noted that MADONNA has
been registered numerous times on different articles of trade. Id. at 329-30.
153. See also Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22 (Cmm’r
Pats. 1943).
154. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. Religious Landscape Sur-
vey: Religious Affiliation: Diverse and Dynamic, 10-12 (Feb. 2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/
pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
155. See 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339, 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
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[t]he application of the name of any religious order or sect to a
product whose use is forbidden to the followers or adherents of
such sect or order is an affront to such persons and tends to
DISPARAGE their beliefs. The use of “SENUSSI” on cigarettes,
therefore, would be SCANDALOUS within the purview of Sec-
tion 2(a) of the Act of 1946 and is not entitled to
registration.156
One can assume that, at that time, the general population would not
know that the Senussi sect is prohibited from smoking.157 Even though the
current standard for assessing scandalous trademarks is to evaluate whether
the mark would be scandalous to a substantial composite of the general
public, decision-makers certainly were inconsistent for decades in assessing
the relevant population for a scandalous objection.158 Perhaps there was an
assumption that offending someone’s religion would, in and of itself, be
considered scandalous to the general population.
Confusion about the tenants of non-majority (or smaller population)
religions caused problems in a subsequent decision involving tobacco, In re
Waughtel, where the Trademark Examiner refused to register AMISH and
design for cigars and cigar boxes.159 The Examiner rejected the mark as
scandalous because it would be disparaging under the targeted group’s re-
ligious tenets as he believed the Amish were forbidden to use tobacco.160
Unfortunately for the Examiner, the applicant provided proof during ap-
pellate review, affidavits from two Amish men, that the religion does not
forbid tobacco in any form.161 The application was allowed to register be-
cause it was not scandalous. Some may categorize this as a problem—the
Examiner raising religious concerns incorrectly. However, in the proper
examination process, most such mistakes would be resolved when the ap-
plicant responds to the Examiner with additional, verified information.
These examples demonstrate two concerns with blending scandalous
and disparaging registration prohibitions. First, neither of these cases in-
volved a third party challenge to the registration. It was incumbent upon
the Trademark Examiner (or perhaps the reviewing body as in the case of
DOUGHBOY) to catch the issue and raise it, and that assumes that the
Examiner properly understands the scope of the targeted groups beliefs or
position. However, placing the burden on members of any group to catch
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. A later decision recognized that this decision blended the distinctions between scan-
dalous and disparaging but did not resolve the issue of how to divide the two. See Jacobs v. Int’l
Multifoods Corp., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165 n.4, 169 (1981),
158. See Abdel-khalik, supra note 40, at 210.
159. See 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594 (1963).
160. See id.
161. See id. Amish in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, have been raising tobacco since
about 1838. JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 120 (4th ed. 1993).
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every offensive trademark before it is registered and used (and thus often
before the applicant has invested in the mark) seems quite unlikely as well
as an abdication of the PTO’s examination responsibility. Second, it sug-
gests that protection of the targeted group is in the hands of the general
population. Especially once it became clear that the scandalous prohibition
only applies to marks that are offensive to a substantial composite of the
general population, any blending between scandalous and disparaging
would not only undermine the distinctions between these two provisions
of the Lanham Act, but would also limit protection of targeted groups
from terms or images that the majority may not find offensive. After all,
religious terms that previously would be scandalous are now regularly al-
lowed to register. For example, the two marks previously rejected as scan-
dalous, MADONNA and AGNUS DEI, are now registered trademarks,162
including one application for MADONNA for wine.163 These new regis-
trations suggest that objections rooted in some sort of antipathy to com-
mercializing religious terms and images has dissipated—for the general
public. If an applicant uses a term or image from a smaller group, perhaps
its religious tenets would lead to an objection to commercialization. Such a
group could no longer rely for protection upon a general population’s an-
tipathy to commercializing religious terms, images, or emblems.
A fairly recent decision, but still pre-Harjo demonstrates the subse-
quent lack of protection for targeted, non-majority religious groups. In
1988, In Over Our Heads, Inc. filed an application for the mark
MOONIES (with a buttocks design) for a doll.164 It is true that the term
“mooning” is a slang term associated with someone dropping their clothes
and exposing a naked backside,165 and given the mark’s design and the
description of the doll in argument, that certainly seems the likely in-
tended meaning. However, Moonies, the noun form, only has one recog-
nized meaning—it refers to the followers of Korean Reverend Sun Myung
Moon and his Unification Church.166 The Unification Church is a small
162. See, e.g., MADONNA FROM MODENA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 4,013,813
(filed Aug. 26, 2010); MADONNA DELLA SCOPERTA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 4,010,795
(filed Apr. 23, 2009); AGNUS DEI CLOTHING, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 3,693,910 (filed
on Sept. 16, 2008); MADONNA PERINATAL SERVICES, U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
3,515,216 (filed Nov. 13, 2007); DA VINCI MADONNA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
2,277,700 (filed May 26, 1998); MADONNA JEWELS, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,660,751
(filed April 26, 1990); MADONNA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,473,554 (filed Dec. 9, 1985);
MADONNA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,463,601 (filed Dec. 9, 1985); MADONNA, U.S.
Trademark Reg. No. 1,386,990 (filed Aug. 5, 1985); MADONNA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
762,471 (filed Oct. 3, 1960).
163. See MADONNA, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 3,545,635 (filed Sept. 15, 2006).
164. See U.S. Serial No. 73/755,278.
165. See Mooning, DICTIONARY.COM, Def. No. 11, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/mooning?s=t (identified as slang definition).
166. See Unification Church, MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION (3d ed.
2001); Moonies, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/moonies?s=t.
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group and highly controversial, often labeled a cult.167 The Examiner re-
jected the MOONIES application as a “mark [that] comprises SCANDAL-
OUS matter which DISPARAGES The Unification Church. . . .”168 As noted
by the TTAB, it was entirely unclear whether the Examiner relied on the
scandalous or disparaging registration prohibition.169 Calling it a close case,
the TTAB reversed, finding that
Applicant’s mark MOONIES – with its naked buttocks design
and spelled without emphasizing the letter “m” – would, when
used on a doll, most likely be perceived as indicating that the
doll “moons,” and would not be perceived as referencing mem-
bers of The Unification Church.170
In a footnote, the TTAB noted that the record contained some evi-
dence that the term “may be viewed by some members of that religious group as
being derogatory.”171 The TTAB discounted that evidence. Because dic-
tionaries, major newspapers, and magazines used the term Moonies as if it
were non-derogatory, the TTAB ruled on the assumption that Moonies is
an accepted and acceptable term for members of The Unification
Church.172 The Moonies may not be the most sympathetic example given
claims that they are a cult, the criticized mass marriages, and the like.173
Regardless, the Unification Church is an exemplar of a small institution
with few members as compared to other religions.174 When considering
the concerns of a small group, the TTAB discounted the term’s impact on
its followers because of the language choice of the general population.175
The blending of scandalous and disparaging prohibitions, explicitly,
has done precisely what one would predict and fear if done implicitly, still
possible post-Harjo, and that is to allow the majority opinion as to meaning
and insult dominate over any referenced small group perceptions. In evalu-
ating disparagement, the TTAB used as the relevant referent the general
167. See, e.g., Emine Saner, I Was a Moonie Cult Leader, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/03/moonie-cult-leader.
168. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1653 n.2.
170. Id. at 1654.
171. Id. at 1654, n.4 (emphasis added)
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Saner, supra note 167; Daniel J. Wakin, Rev. Sun Myung Moon, Self-Proclaimed
Messiah Who Built Religious Movement, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2012), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/world/asia/rev-sun-myung-moon-founder-of-unification-
church-dies-at-92.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
174. While The Unification Church estimated its membership at 3 million, authorities
suggest that the membership was 50,000 at the height of the Church’s reach. See Wakin, supra
note 173.
175. Id.
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public and its perception of the term (via dictionaries, newspapers, and
magazines) regardless of whether it would be seen as offensive to members
of The Unification Church. After all, the reasoning is, the majority would
never use such an offensive term in such a public and consistent manner.
And yet Native Americans have been protesting the common use of
r__s___s for more than two decades at this point. Only recently has the
general public opened its mind to the objections.
This is not to say that, had the TTAB assessed the MOONIES appli-
cation from the perspective of the non-majority group members, it would
have reached a different result. The critique is not the result (nor can it be)
but the process. As the current dispute regarding the Washington team
demonstrates, what the majority considers scandalous often discounts or
blatantly ignores the perceptions of the targeted group. Charitably, one
hopes it is because the majority group has not been exposed to indicia of
harm. The application process can rectify that lack.
B. Blending the Justifications Hides the Distinct Need for a Disparaging
Prohibition
It is undisputed that the TTAB’s decision in Harjo is the first articula-
tion of the modern disparagement test, which, on its face, appears to sepa-
rate the disparaging and scandalous prohibitions. However, it created the
test by relying on the scandalousness precedent. The District Court for the
District of Columbia noted that there is no error in treating the two as
similar because (1) the TTAB noted differences where appropriate (by sub-
stituting disparaging for scandalousness and changing the relevant impact
audience), and (2) there is little legislative history to provide guidance.176
However, the framework insufficiently addresses the different policy inter-
ests at play and statutory language differences. In so doing, it runs the risk
of masking the distinct benefit afforded by the disparaging prohibition to
identity and religious objections.
On its face, the scandalous prohibition is unrelated to the concerns
that animate trademark protection—consumer confusion, encouraging
better quality products, providing information to consumers, and any
other related concern.177 The legislative history provides no direct, clear
answer as to why Congress enacted the prohibition although one contem-
porary commentator considered the justification to be “obvious.”178 Sub-
sequently, two justifications have been posited. First, there was a concern
176. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d. 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2003).
177. See, e.g., Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Regis-
tration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 673-74 (1993); see also
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPY-
RIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 600 (2003) (noting that the scandalous registration prohi-
bition, unlike other prohibitions, is unrelated to competitors communicating with the public or
avoiding deception).
178. TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES: FOR THE BUSINESSMAN 25 (Munn & Co., 1912).
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that a federal registration would be perceived as implicit, governmental
approval of the mark.179 After the first fell from favor,180 courts raised the
second justification, that scandalous marks should not occupy the time,
services, and use of federal funds.181 At its root, such a justification is still a
decision that certain marks are of less value, and the lesser value simply
cannot be based on an unfair competition concern. Regardless, courts
have rejected any implication that §2(a) reflects an intent to regulate
morality.182
Courts have stated even less regarding why we have the disparaging
prohibition. In the context of laches, the initial Harjo decision held that
there is a public policy interest in preventing registration where the marks
may “hold a substantial segment of the population up to public ridi-
cule.”183 The Harjo and Blackhorse decisions, and the spurt of reports and
studies in the wake of the dispute, have shown these consequences to the
targeted population in stark relief. First, there are harms caused by stere-
otyping. As noted by a counseling psychology expert in the Harjo matter,
stereotyping in culture can negatively impact members of the target group
by objectifying and dehumanizing.184 These conclusions are substantiated
by studies assessing the negative impact of stereotypes on women and Afri-
can Americans as well as Native Americans.185 Numerous studies demon-
strate that racial slurs and similar forms of discrimination affect the mental
and physical health of the targeted group’s members.186 The consequences
include depression and low self-esteem, which can result in aggressive be-
179. WILLIAM EVARTS RICHARDS & WILLIAM WALLACE WHITE, UNITED STATES PAT-
ENTS, TRADE MARKS, DESIGNS AND COPYRIGHTS 91, 92 (2d ed. 1896); In re McGinley, 660
F.2d 481, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1981); see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859, 1861-
62 (T.T.A.B. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust as the issu-
ance of a registration does not indicate any endorsement of the goods on which the mark is used,
it also does not imply the government’s pronouncement that the mark is a good one, from an
aesthetic or any other viewpoint.”).
180. See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3
(T.T.A.B. 1993).
181. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486. But see In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487 (Rich, J.,
dissenting) (“More ‘public funds’ are being expended in the prosecution of this appeal than
would ever result from the registration of the mark.”).
182. See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486.
183. Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.3d (BNA) 1828, 1831 (T.T.A.B. 1994)
184. See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707-08 (T.T.A.B.
1999).
185. See, e.g., Michael A. Friedman, The Harmful Psychological Effects of the Washington Foot-
ball Mascot, 9-11, available at http://www.changethemascot.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
DrFriedmanReport.pdf (2013) (a report commissioned by the Oneida Indian Nation) (citing
studies demonstrating negative impact of stereotyping on academic performance and body
image).
186. See id. at 14-15 (citing studies related to African Americans, Latinos, gays and lesbians,
the elderly, and obese as well as Native Americans).
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havior years later and higher rates of suicide.187 It also can create a hostile
learning environment, decreasing students’ ability to academically suc-
ceed.188 Even when the stereotype was intended to be beneficial or to be
positive, it still imparts psychological harm to members of the targeted
group.189
Not surprisingly, the negative stereotype is more readily identified as
negative by those who are in the targeted population, and it impacts their
self-esteem disproportionately.190 However, studies specifically focused on
Native American images demonstrate that stereotyping does impact those
outside the target population by reinforcing negative attitudes.191 This
negative reinforcement exists even when a flattering image of Chief Il-
liniwek, the University of Illinois mascot, was used—and even increased
anti-Asian stereotypes at the same time.192 It also reinforces the notion that
stereotyping, in and of itself, is an appropriate tool to use.193 Further,
based upon additional studies, these stereotypes result in strengthening im-
plicit bias against Native American people and mascots194 and dominate
the conversation with such negativity that Native Americans cannot prop-
erly portray themselves or their various cultures.195 These harms were also
cited by the American Psychological Association in a 2005 resolution call-
ing for the immediate retirement of Native American symbols and imagery
from any level of school, and the resolution includes references to more
than thirty studies.196
The harms are numerous and well documented. Certainly, Congress
may not have had this precise set of harms in mind when constructing the
disparaging prohibition. But there are two key facts to show that they did
intend the prohibition to have broad reach. The first is the use of “tends
to” or “may” disparage. Either “tends to” or “may” allows for greater
latitude than the language of other prohibitions. This suggests that Con-
187. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727; Friedman, supra note 185, at 15, 16-17.
188. Erik Stegman & Victoria Phillips, Missing the Point: The Real Impact of Native Mascots
and Team Names on American Indian and Alaska Native Youth, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (2014)
[hereinafter Stegman & Phillips], available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/StegmanAIANmascots-reportv2.pdf.
189. See Friedman, supra note 185, at 9, 10.
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id. at 11-13.
192. Id. at 12.
193. Stegman & Phillips, supra note 188, at 4 (citing a 2001 statement from the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights).
194. See Friedman, supra note 185, at 12.
195. Stegman & Phillips, supra note 188.
196. The American Psychological Association, Resolution Recommending the Immediate
Retirement of American Indian Mascots, Symbols, Images, and Personalities by Schools, Col-
leges, Universities, Athletic Teams, and Organizations, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/mas-
cots.pdf (2005).
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gress was cognizant that the harm encapsulated by disparaging marks is so
significant as to be prohibited based upon probability or even possibility
rather than certainty at any level. Second, the failure to change the term
“disparaging” is notable in the legislative history. When the USPTO rep-
resentative complained that the term disparaging was too comprehensive
to manage in the registration process, Representative Lanham invited the
representative, and presumably the USPTO by extension, to submit better
language. Yet, the word disparaging stayed in place. Now, we have choices
regarding how to use it.
C. Choices
When considering the disparaging prohibition and how it can be
used to protect against trademarks that offend based on identity and relig-
ion, there are at least three changes that should be made. As a predicate,
decision-makers must be reminded that the relevant standard is offensive to
a substantial composite, not the majority, of the referenced group at the
relevant time. Evidence that a non-trivial segment of the targeted group is
offended should be sufficient. This leads to the first change; the current
two-pronged test places too high a burden of proof regarding the dispar-
agement. When Congress changed from “tends to disparage” to “may dis-
parage,” the language difference has meaning. Rather than seeking
evidence that offense is probabilistic (tends), the evidentiary standard
should be lowered to something less certain—even to acknowledge pos-
sibilities (may). Simply keeping in mind that the statutory language de-
mands less certainty increases the chance that minority voices are heard
regarding offense. Second, the current standard requires that, if there is
doubt as to satisfying a prohibition’s requirements, the doubt falls in favor
of the applicant; the application is allowed to proceed forward. When one
takes into account both the broader statutory scope and the harm caused
by identity and religiously offensive marks, the doubt presumption should
flip the other way. When in doubt or in a close call, the examiner and
TTAB should err on the side of exclusion. Not only does that comport
with statutory language, but it also better reflects the unique harm caused
by disparaging identity and religion marks—harms that relate to psycho-
logical well-being rather than economic concerns alone. Third, the major-
ity decision’s position in In re Lebanese Arak must prevail and become
incorporated into the disparaging test. When assessing the first prong, the
likely meaning of the mark, it must be assessed from the referenced group’s
perspective, not the general population. If there are multiple referenced
groups, then they should all be identified to determine if the mark is offen-
sive to any potentially relevant group. Again, this ties back to the unique
justification for disparagement from that of scandalous, protecting smaller
groups from significant harm.
The benefits from these changes affect both populations. Not only
does it minimize the harm caused to the non-majority groups, it also pro-
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vides greater information to the majority groups that may have been una-
ware of the offense. Once informed, the trademark applicants can make a
choice. Do they want to hear the non-majority voices? Or will they
choose to use the trademark anyway, which is their right under the com-
mon law (although without some benefits afforded by federal registration).
Because most trademark applications are intent-to-use applications, mean-
ing the applicant has not used the mark at the time of filing,197 an informa-
tive and clearer message from the USPTO can also prevent an applicant
from investing in a mark that may be offensive to a segment of the popula-
tion (if it respects that concern) or, if it manages to register to mark, be
aware that it may be challenged by third parties as disparaging.
CONCLUSION
There have been calls to abolish both the scandalous and disparaging
trademark from a variety of sources and for a variety of reasons. Once
again, conflating the two prohibitions can cause great harm by ignoring
the unique problems that the disparaging prohibition can prevent. These
harms, caused by “words that wound,” have long been recognized by legal
scholars.198 The disparaging prohibition provides a mechanism to help
minimize words that wound and also can prevent uninformed adoption
and acceptance by the general population of these harmful words and
images. Certainly, the Washington team’s marks have rendered a racial slur
part of common parlance and, as alleged, without alleviating the harm.
True, the prohibition is not a panacea. Trademark owners can con-
tinue to assert common law rights and otherwise have strong First Amend-
ment rights as they should have. However, in the commercial context of
choosing products to purchase, people should not have to be faced with
such harmful terms potentially integrated into daily life without refuge.
And when faced with the loss of registration benefits, entities can make an
informed decision about whether non-majority voices, feelings, and harm
matter.
197. Since the Intent-to-Use application became available, the number of Intent to Use
Applications has grown as a percentage of overall applications and constituted more than half of
all applications by 1993. Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law:
A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836-37, n.45 (2000); see also
Barton Beebe, Is the TM Office a Rubber Stamp?, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 751, 772-73 (2011) (noting
1,951,933 ITU applications and 1,336,759 use based applications between 1989 and 2007).
198. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R-C.L.L. REV. 133 (1982).

